Post by Kanjamas Views on Sept 21, 2005 1:05:14 GMT 3
Crossfire
Devolution: Exploding the ‘weaker president’ myth
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By charles Kanjama
A debate on the Wako draft has to consider the Bomas Draft and the current constitution.
Opponents of the Wako draft come from two schools of thought. The first are the Bomas integralists, who hold that the Bomas document was the will of the people, their whole will and nothing but their will. Bomas integralists as a rule criticise all Wako draft’s variations from Bomas.
In contrast are Bomas-Wako critics, who doubt that Bomas was a suitable document.
Their stubborn opposition to the draft originates from dislike of the original CKRC draft that started the process.
Bomas-Wako critics often accept that Bomas was a flawed process, but are convinced that Wako’s draft was an even bigger distortion of constitution making.
Bomas integralists will vote ‘No’ hoping thereby to force a resurrection of the Bomas draft. Bomas-Wako critics will vote ‘No’ hoping to force a reconsideration of the fundamental flaws, and whether inherited from CKRC/Bomas or introduced by Wako is not the issue.
Supporters of Wako also come from two schools: There is the smaller school of hardcore Wako-fundamentalists, who hold that the Wako draft is the best thing since sliced bread.
They believe the Wako draft genuinely reflects the people’s views.
These are generally the Kilifi draft enthusiasts.
There is a larger school of Wako supporters who may be called Wako pragmatists.
This group comprises those who acknowledge that the Wako draft is the product of a flawed process, or that the Wako draft has some flawed provisions.
But they are proportionalists or mathematicians, likely to assert that the Wako draft is 80 per cent or 90 per cent good. These are generally the Naivasha Accord enthusiasts.
Wako fundamentalists will vote ‘Yes’ in the belief that this will be the end of the review.
Wako-pragmatists will vote ‘Yes’ to safeguard incremental gains in the draft, while hoping that the Constitution will be improved further after promulgation.
Kibe Mungai is a Wako pragmatist; I’m a Bomas-Wako critic.
The Wako pragmatist believes dictatorship is only possible in the current Constitution, because he identifies the current Constitution with Presidents Moi and Kenyatta, whose leaderships turned autocratic in later years.
Wako fundamentalists yearn for a powerful president, without caring that often the aids of a strong president are the weapons of an autocratic one.
They recognise that the Wako draft will make the incumbent president impossible to remove through Parliament. They added the 75 per cent impeachment clause in Kilifi precisely to ensure this.
Wako fundamentalists know the President will easily control and manipulate Parliament to get his appointments through. That is why they institutionalised presidential poaching of opposition MPs into an expansive Cabinet.
They are pleased that the president will have the aura of an African chief.
They retained a notional prime minister precisely to insulate the president from parliamentary control or criticism.
Wako pragmatists believe the Wako draft improves on the current constitution while strengthening the "weak Bomas president".
They praise Wako for limiting presidential tenure to two terms, without realising that the current constitution does the same. They praise Wako for creating a majority president, without realising the president’s greater legitimacy makes it easier for him to turn autocratic, thus the greater need to for checks.
Wako pragmatists praise the deputy president’s security of tenure, as solving the succession crisis.
They don’t realise that the president can play off the prime minister, whom he can appoint and give any executive powers at will (art 163(2)(c)), against the deputy president, who is an outsider in parliamentary politics. The lame-duck vice-president will not be a thing of the past.
A scrutiny of the Wako draft’s contradictions exposes the deputy president’s vulnerability. He shall not be an elected MP (art 158(4)). With the president, he is excluded from membership of Parliament (art 116).
But the president maintains aristocratic touch with Parliament through his addresses (art 144(1)), his appointments (art 144(2), 163, 168(4)), and his legislative mandate of veto (art 127).
The vice-president’s role in contrast is limited to assigned duties (art 160(1)) and to a curtailed temporary assumed responsibility during the president’s absence (art 160(3), 145(2)).
One wonders whether he would conduct any business in Parliament (art 123(2)) except during periods of assumed responsibility. Such a deputy president has been given security of tenure with one hand, but denied political effectiveness with the other.
No, he is not a stronger deputy than the vice-president in our current system!
Wako pragmatists also inexplicably believe that the Wako president will be more answerable to the people because he needs to get a countrywide majority during re-election. But the decree of political obscurity for unsuccessful challengers will shrivel the opposition base during re-election, and chill subsequent parliamentary opposition.
The lack of a Senate, and of strong devolved government will reduce the seedbeds for future presidents to members of a captive Parliament and a meek Cabinet.
MPs will be worried of the political risks of unsuccessful presidential campaigns, thus allowing an incumbent to control re-election and manipulate succession.
The long line of Banquo’s kings, prophesied by the three witches in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, will be Wako’s legacy for future generations.
The Wako executive is a cynical mutilation of Bomas aspirations.
Even our current executive president is less powerful than his Wako counterpart will be because he must retain 50 per cent Parliamentary support.
The need to retain the support of a fractious coalition of parties reduces his power to hire and fire ministers at will.
Section 1A of our Constitution defines Kenya as "a multiparty democracy", making the appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet without corporate consent potentially unconstitutional. Wako sanctifies this anomalous use of presidential power.
Considering the Executive alone, the current Constitution and Bomas trump Wako’s innovation.
Devolution: Exploding the ‘weaker president’ myth
----------------------------------------------------------------
By charles Kanjama
A debate on the Wako draft has to consider the Bomas Draft and the current constitution.
Opponents of the Wako draft come from two schools of thought. The first are the Bomas integralists, who hold that the Bomas document was the will of the people, their whole will and nothing but their will. Bomas integralists as a rule criticise all Wako draft’s variations from Bomas.
In contrast are Bomas-Wako critics, who doubt that Bomas was a suitable document.
Their stubborn opposition to the draft originates from dislike of the original CKRC draft that started the process.
Bomas-Wako critics often accept that Bomas was a flawed process, but are convinced that Wako’s draft was an even bigger distortion of constitution making.
Bomas integralists will vote ‘No’ hoping thereby to force a resurrection of the Bomas draft. Bomas-Wako critics will vote ‘No’ hoping to force a reconsideration of the fundamental flaws, and whether inherited from CKRC/Bomas or introduced by Wako is not the issue.
Supporters of Wako also come from two schools: There is the smaller school of hardcore Wako-fundamentalists, who hold that the Wako draft is the best thing since sliced bread.
They believe the Wako draft genuinely reflects the people’s views.
These are generally the Kilifi draft enthusiasts.
There is a larger school of Wako supporters who may be called Wako pragmatists.
This group comprises those who acknowledge that the Wako draft is the product of a flawed process, or that the Wako draft has some flawed provisions.
But they are proportionalists or mathematicians, likely to assert that the Wako draft is 80 per cent or 90 per cent good. These are generally the Naivasha Accord enthusiasts.
Wako fundamentalists will vote ‘Yes’ in the belief that this will be the end of the review.
Wako-pragmatists will vote ‘Yes’ to safeguard incremental gains in the draft, while hoping that the Constitution will be improved further after promulgation.
Kibe Mungai is a Wako pragmatist; I’m a Bomas-Wako critic.
The Wako pragmatist believes dictatorship is only possible in the current Constitution, because he identifies the current Constitution with Presidents Moi and Kenyatta, whose leaderships turned autocratic in later years.
Wako fundamentalists yearn for a powerful president, without caring that often the aids of a strong president are the weapons of an autocratic one.
They recognise that the Wako draft will make the incumbent president impossible to remove through Parliament. They added the 75 per cent impeachment clause in Kilifi precisely to ensure this.
Wako fundamentalists know the President will easily control and manipulate Parliament to get his appointments through. That is why they institutionalised presidential poaching of opposition MPs into an expansive Cabinet.
They are pleased that the president will have the aura of an African chief.
They retained a notional prime minister precisely to insulate the president from parliamentary control or criticism.
Wako pragmatists believe the Wako draft improves on the current constitution while strengthening the "weak Bomas president".
They praise Wako for limiting presidential tenure to two terms, without realising that the current constitution does the same. They praise Wako for creating a majority president, without realising the president’s greater legitimacy makes it easier for him to turn autocratic, thus the greater need to for checks.
Wako pragmatists praise the deputy president’s security of tenure, as solving the succession crisis.
They don’t realise that the president can play off the prime minister, whom he can appoint and give any executive powers at will (art 163(2)(c)), against the deputy president, who is an outsider in parliamentary politics. The lame-duck vice-president will not be a thing of the past.
A scrutiny of the Wako draft’s contradictions exposes the deputy president’s vulnerability. He shall not be an elected MP (art 158(4)). With the president, he is excluded from membership of Parliament (art 116).
But the president maintains aristocratic touch with Parliament through his addresses (art 144(1)), his appointments (art 144(2), 163, 168(4)), and his legislative mandate of veto (art 127).
The vice-president’s role in contrast is limited to assigned duties (art 160(1)) and to a curtailed temporary assumed responsibility during the president’s absence (art 160(3), 145(2)).
One wonders whether he would conduct any business in Parliament (art 123(2)) except during periods of assumed responsibility. Such a deputy president has been given security of tenure with one hand, but denied political effectiveness with the other.
No, he is not a stronger deputy than the vice-president in our current system!
Wako pragmatists also inexplicably believe that the Wako president will be more answerable to the people because he needs to get a countrywide majority during re-election. But the decree of political obscurity for unsuccessful challengers will shrivel the opposition base during re-election, and chill subsequent parliamentary opposition.
The lack of a Senate, and of strong devolved government will reduce the seedbeds for future presidents to members of a captive Parliament and a meek Cabinet.
MPs will be worried of the political risks of unsuccessful presidential campaigns, thus allowing an incumbent to control re-election and manipulate succession.
The long line of Banquo’s kings, prophesied by the three witches in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, will be Wako’s legacy for future generations.
The Wako executive is a cynical mutilation of Bomas aspirations.
Even our current executive president is less powerful than his Wako counterpart will be because he must retain 50 per cent Parliamentary support.
The need to retain the support of a fractious coalition of parties reduces his power to hire and fire ministers at will.
Section 1A of our Constitution defines Kenya as "a multiparty democracy", making the appointment of opposition MPs into Cabinet without corporate consent potentially unconstitutional. Wako sanctifies this anomalous use of presidential power.
Considering the Executive alone, the current Constitution and Bomas trump Wako’s innovation.